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Abstract
OpenPGP, an IETF Proposed Standard based on PGP R©
application, has its own Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
architecture which is different from the one based on
X.509, another standard from ITU. This paper describes
the OpenPGP PKI; the historical perspective as well as
its current use. We also compare three PKI technolo-
gies standardized by IETF: OpenPGP, PKIX(X.509), and
SPKI/SDSI.
Since the OpenPGP PKI works without a registration
authority nor certification authority, it fits well with the
Internet communication with voluntary community. For
example, the digital signature for email including the se-
curity patch program of free software is usually signed by
not an authorized organization but the cross-PGP-signed
individuals who belong to different organizations or na-
tions.
The current OpenPGP PKI issues include the capabil-
ity of a PGP keyserver and its performance. PGP key-
servers have been developed and operated by volunteers
since the 1990s. The keyservers distribute, merge, and ex-
pire the OpenPGP public keys. Major keyserver managers
from several countries have built the globally distributed
network of PGP keyservers. However, the current PGP
Public Keyserver (pksd) has some limitations. It does not
support fully the OpenPGP format so that it is neither ex-
pandable nor flexible, without any cluster technology.
Finally we introduce the project on the next genera-
tion OpenPGP public keyserver called the OpenPKSD,
lead by Hironobu Suzuki, one of the authors, and
funded by Japanese Information-technology Promotion
Agency(IPA).
1 Introduction
Authentication is an essential factor of information se-
curity in network society. The difficulty of building a
Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a major impediment to
strong authentication. Without PKI, we cannot trust nei-
ther digital signature nor certification based on the public
key cryptosystem via wide-area network.
In following section 2 and 3, we overview the PKI ar-
chitecture comparing several models. In section 4, we
examine a PKI without authorities which is presented by
the OpenPGP technology and compare it with the other
models. Then we point out the role of the PGP keyserver
in section 6 and introduce the next generation OpenPGP
public keyserver project in section 7. Finally we give
some conclusions.
2 PKI architectures
PKI has three core functions as follows to manage the
users’ certification and trust relations [25, s.v. “public-
key infrastructure”]:
1. to register users and issue their public-key certifi-
cates
2. to revoke certificates when required
3. to archive data needed to validate certificates at a
much later time
To operate these three functions with many users on a
large-scale network, many PKI have a hierarchical struc-
ture for CAs and are built using a centralized architecture.
However there are alternatives.
PKI is categorized by the architecture types as fol-
lows: 1) hierarchical PKI, 2) mesh PKI, and 3) trust-file
PKI [25, s.v. “trusted certificate”]. The difference is the
way how they rely on CA (Certification Authority). A
hierarchical PKI has the most significant CA in terms of
trust at the root of the hierarchy tree. A mesh PKI has CAs
issue cross-certificates to each other. A trust-file PKI has
a local file of public-key certificates that the user trusts as
starting points for certification chain.
For example, popular browsers are distributed with an
initial file of trusted certificates, the starting points for cer-
tification paths. The initial file is different between among
the each PKI architecture. In a hierarchical PKI, the ini-
tial file is the root certificate in a hierarchical PKI. It is
usually “baked into” the browsers with no decisions by
the users to trust them. In a mesh PKI, it is the certificate
of the CA that issued the user’s own certificate. And in
a trust-file PKI, any certificates including self-signed cer-
tificates accepted by the user can be the first public key in
a certification path.
3 PKI standards
To build PKIs, different standards are developed. They are
based on their own framework and architecture and they
are never the same. This section compares different PKI
architectures: 1) X.509 standard from ITU, 2) OpenPGP,
an IETF Proposed standard based on PGP R© application,
and 3) SPKI, another standards based on the theoretical
research.
X.509 is the earliest framework to provide and sup-
port authentication including formats for X.509 public-
key certificates, X.509 attribute certificates, and X.509
CRLs. X.509 is the hierarchical PKI that a CA, central
digital certificates issuer, is responsible for managing the
certificates.
Historically, X.509 was standardized by ITU-T (Inter-
national Telecommunication Union Telecommunication
sector, formerly CCITT) and turned to be ISO standard.
X.509 follows the X.500 directory service and provides
an example of reliable authentication and certification. In
practice, developers relax the strict X.500 service scheme.
For example, X.509v3 (Version 3) certificate has “exten-
sions” field for flexible operation.
IETF had discussed about the design based on X.509
framework from each applications to general PKI. Inter-
net standards for X.509 PKI framework is developed at
IETF Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group.
PKIX not only profiles X.509 standards, but also develops
new standards apropos to the use of X.509-based PKIs in
the Internet.
One of the most popular implemen-
tations of X.509-based PKI is OpenSSL
(http://www.openssl.org/, formerly SSLeay).
OpenSSL is a set of Open Source cryptography libtaries
including X.509 CA operation scripts and distributed
freely, such as a part of PKI package for either commer-
cial or non-commercial purpose.
OpenPGP is the standard based on Pretty Good
Privacy R© (PGP R©) application which is developed by
Philip Zimmermann [12]. PGP R© is provided as
commercial version and ‘freeware’ version for non-
commercial/non-governmental purposes only.
The specification of PGP is standardized as OpenPGP
by IETF OpenPGP Working Group. Today “OpenPGP
Message Format” is defined in RFC2440 [3] and to be
updated [4]. The most popular OpenPGP implemena-
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tion is GnuPG (GNU Privacy Guard), developed by Free
Software Foundation and maintained by Werner Koch
of GUUG (German Unix Users Group). Either PGP or
GnuPG has been known as email cryptography software
firstly, however they has become the general purpose data
encryption tool, including key exchange over Internet,
trust computation, etc. In the following sections, we ex-
amine the only PKI part of OpenPGP.
It is worth to point out another possible architec-
ture, as we sometimes take an closed binary question
such as “X.509 or OpenPGP, which is better?”, not as
“Which PKI will be the appropriate solution for differ-
ent usage-scenarios?”. There exists another PKI stan-
dardized by IETF — SPKI (Simple Public Key Infras-
tructure). IETF SPKI Working Group finished its initial
standardization process and bring into the inter-operation
stage [16, 10]. It is also called SPKI/SDSI as it is a joint
force with SDSI (Simple Distributed Security Infrastruc-
ture) research. SPKI is designed with distributed and scal-
able architecture in many aspects, i.e., no single root CA,
no globally distinguished name, and flexible validity pe-
riods [1, 13].
Table 2 shows the technical comparison of X.509,
OpenPGP, and SPKI/SDSI based on the analysis by
Clarke [7].
4 Certification without Authority
4.1 From Face-to-Face to Web of Trust
Without a certification authority, the problem of trusting
keys arise to assess applicants before giving out certifi-
cates. In OpenPGP, there are no official mechanism for
creating certificates, no officail channel for acquiring and
distributing. It makes the process of certification into the
face-to-face, ad hoc situation. Each end user is respobsi-
ble to decide which certificate (public key of an user) is
trusted and accepted to be added into their local trust-file
(denoted “keyring” in PGP).
This certification process does not require a trusted,
monitored registration authority or certification authority,
however, it lacks scalability. So since PGP R© 2.0 [15,
pp. 201–203], “web of trust” model that PGP signer acts
as an introducer between people had been supported.
Figure 1 illustrates the model of hierarchical PKI and
web of trust.
Figure 1: Hierarchical PKI and Web of Trust [5]
4.2 Internet Usage Scenarios
OpenPGP has its own market which is different with
X.509, and OpenPGP community has grown in a global
Internet.
The most famous and critical use might be security
alerts. FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security
Teams) and its members including CERT(Computer
Emergency ResponseTeam)/CC(Coordination Center)
have their official PGP/GnuPG public keys publicly
available [11], and have signed their alerts with their own
PGP/GnuPG key.
Usenet, operated by volunteer NetNews managers,
is another example of the distributed network with
OpenPGP PKI. The digital signature for Usenet control
commands should be signed with PGP keys of represented
voluntary managers since 1990s [14].
4.3 What is the Web of Trust?
OpenPGP provides key management and certificate ser-
vices using local trust-file PKI. The more signature is ac-
cepted, the more trust-file generated. Figure 2 is an exam-
ple of a trust-file visualized the relashonship of OpenPGP
signature. This graph illustrates who introduce the other
or who meets with face-to-face, in other words, whose key
signed the others’ public key. There are no central author-
ities but multiplexed indivisual relationships in a commu-
nity.
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Figure 2: Visialized Web of Certificate [8]
However, this graph is not a “web of trust” but just a
“web of certificates”. OpenPGP separate the trustworthy
from validity of cerfiticate. For example, the amount of
trust of the introducer and unknown newcomer is different
for an OpenPGP user. Even if their certification is valid,
the issuer of the key is not an authority but the users own.
So OpenPGP users should be responsible on “Whose keys
should be taken as valid but untrusted?” [26, p. 81].
In OpenPGP, users issue their signature to the other’s
public key with their degree of trust. This is denoted “trust
signature” and represented as (trust level, trust amount)
with OpenPGP key management and certificate service.
An ordinary valid signed key is trust level 0, and The
signed key is asserted to be a valid trusted introducer is
level 1. Level 2 means “meta introducer” or “introducer-
of-introducer” that its signed key is asserted to be trusted
to issue level 1 trust signatures. (Generally, as the intro-
ducer is more trustworthy, a level n trust signature asserts
that a key is trusted to issue level n − 1 trust signatures.)
The trust amount is in a range from 0–255, and appointed
60 for partial trust and 120 for complete trust [3, s.v.
“Trust Signature”]. As OpenPGP distinguished the trust
from validity, “web of trust” is also distinguished from
“web of certificates”.
4.4 PGP Revocation Problem
The weakest link of OpenPGP PKI is the revocation of
public key [22, pp. 585–586] [9, p. 309]. As there is no
official channel for acquiring and distributing OpenPGP
public keys, there are no guarantee about how to tell ev-
eryone that your key is no longer valid.
The typical answer to this revocation problem of PGP is
to use PGP public keyserver for distributing certification.
“Typically, to communicate that a certificate has been re-
voked, a signed note, called a key revocation certificate, is
posted on PGP certificate servers, and widely distributed
to people who have the key on their public keyrings. Peo-
ple wishing to communicate with the affected user, or use
the affected key to authenticate other keys, are warned
about the hazards of using that public key” [7, pp. 56–
57]. However, there are few research on the PGP public
keyserver and usually the keyserver is not considered as
the part of OpenPGP PKI. In the following, this paper ex-
amines PGP keyserver as the part of OpenPGP PKI.
5 Related Works
There are several research fields related to OpenPGP pub-
lic keyserver. The first is the study on the traditional PGP
public keyservers, the second is the integrated channel for
OpenPGP key distribution, and the third is the combined
“web of trust” with other PKI.
A “web of trust” used in PGP is referred in several
researches including the peer-to-peer authentication [9],
trust computation [17, 5], and privacy enhanced technol-
ogy [12]. However, there are few description on PGP key-
server. It might be because PGP keyserver mechanism is
too simple. It is not a CA but just a pool of public keys.
From users’ viewpoint, PGP keyserver has a large amount
of OpenPGP public keys that provide the interesting mate-
rial for social analysis of network community. For exam-
ple, OpenPGP keyserver developer Jonathan McDowell
also developed “Experimental PGP key path finder” [18]
that searches and displays the chain of certification be-
tween the users.
As OpenPGP’s initial trust file is blank, the users have
to start with a face-to-face certificate to exchange pub-
lic keys. Though another initial file is provided via high
integrity channel. Global Internet Trust Register [2] is
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a printed book that contains “fingerprints” (hash values
of certificate) of the most important public keys (mainly
cryptography experts who are likely to have signed many
other keys in their respectice communities) [26, pp. 80–
81].
OpenPGP PKI itself can be described as the superset of
PKI [32], however, combining OpenPGP PKI with other
authentication system is challenging work in both theoret-
ical and operational field. Formal study of trust relation-
ship of PKI started in the late 1990s [17, 5] and GnuPG
development version in December 2002 started to support
its trust calculation with GnuPGP’s trust signature.
The implementation of trust calculation is ongoing and
using large-scale “web of trust” (not “web of certificates”)
is not so popular outside of computer experts. On the
other hands, using different types of PKI has become
more popular.
In the early work at MIT, PGP-signing service had been
combined with Kerberos CA system that does not have
public key cryptography [21]. Today, the hybrid sys-
tem of OpenPGP and X.509 is both developed into some
OpenPGP implementations. In 2001, German authorities
BSI (Bundesamt fu¨r Sicherheit in der Informationstech-
nik, Germany’s agency for information technology secu-
rity) accept the ¨Agypten project for Open Source imple-
mentation of governmental mail user agents Sphinx which
supports X.509v3, PKCS, LDAP, and OpenPGP [19].
The results of the open development are begun to im-
ported to other commercial products in 2002–2003 [23].
In a same way, PGP Corporation also released PGP R© ver-
sion 8.0 as X.509-enabled application that can interoper-
ate X.509 certificates and CAs [20].
6 OpenPGP Public Keyserver
Before describing our research, this section describes
OpenPGP keyserver generally. Keyserver is not a CA.
It only pool anyone’s public keys. Keyserver never issue
any certificate for someone’s public key but only provide
it.
6.1 Current Status
The first keyserver is developed at MIT in 1994
by Brian A. LaMacchia. It exchange public keys
with email and keys are managemented with PGP
command. For users, keyserver acts as an easy
email agent who receives any valid but untrusted
keys, then searches and provides the key to ev-
eryone. In 1997, PGP Public KeyServer (pksd,
http://www.mit.edu/people/marc/pks/)
started by MIT student Marc Horowitz. Pksd uses a
database management system and has been working fine.
The database system is operated via email, CGI-interface
from http server, and HKP — pksd’s own communication
protocol over Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP).
In 2003, David Shaw of GnuPG team proposed the
OpenPGP HTTP Keyserver Protocol [24] based on
traditional HKP as the draft for Internet Standard.
Today pksd has been working fine even if in global
distributed network. There are 10 or more syncronized
public keyservers in the world and the most of them are
running with patched pksd. These public keyservers are
operated by voluntary managers belong to organizations
including MIT and Georgia Tech in United States,
SURFnet in Netherlands, DFN-CERT in Germany,
RedIRIS (IRIS-CERT) in Spain, JPNIC in Japan. To-
day they have more than 1,400,000 public keys entries
and 3,000/day or more transactions between each sync
sites. In 2000, SURFnet held the first PGP keyserver man-
ager symposium [27] and the managers keep in touch with
each other.
6.2 Revocation process and Keyserver
As public keyservers provides semi-official key dis-
tribution channel, keyserver adds powerful feature to
OpenPGP PKI. Public keyservers can handle the PGP re-
vocation problem that we described in section 4.4. Using
keyserver provides an answer to the question “How do
you tell everyone that your key is no longer valid?”. User
may issue a suicide note (denoted as “revocation signa-
ture” in OpenPGP ) and post it to keyservers. Receiving
a valid revocation signature, keyserver updates the key to
be revoked. The update key with revocation signature is
redistributed to the synchronized keyservers in the world,
and finally PGP user updates their keyrings with the near-
est keyserver. The updated key with valid revoked signa-
ture makes users’s older key not to be used.
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6.3 Current Keyserver Problem
Today’s sisutation around PGP keyserver is beyond the
original developers’ idea, and current pksd also has some
limitations.
Firstly, the implementations of pksd are not OpenPGP-
compliant. OpenPGP [3] published in 1998 defines
two versions of signature formats. (Version 3 pro-
vides basic OpenPGP signature information, while ver-
sion 4 provides an expandable format with subpackets.)
These changes made traditional PGP applications not-
OpenPGP-compliant — not only PGP R© [3, s.v. “Imple-
mentation Nits”] but also pksd. Today pksd does not fully
support OpenPGP format.
Seconary, the pksd does not scalability for global use.
Though pksd has simple but strong dabatabase manage-
ment system, it is neither soshisticated nor scalable com-
pared with today’s Internet server. For the matter, pksd
cannot handle 1 billion keys and cannot accept such many
transactions as Yahoo! or eBay site. New design of
OpenPGP public keyserver is required.
7 OpenPKSD: Next Generation
OpenPGP Public Keyserver
We introduce our next generation OpenPGP Public Key-
server project with a new architecture. We call it
OpenPKSD ( OpenPGP Public KeyServer Daemon).
It is developed by one of the authors and funded
by Japanese Information-technology Promotion Agency
(IPA) in 2001–2002.
7.1 Server Design and Implementation
OpenPKSD supports OpenPGP subpacket format and
works as high-performance server with SQL backend.
The design of OpenPKSD oriented to not only high-
performance, but also flexible extension capability and
easy operation. We implemented OpenPKSD with Ruby
and PostgreSQL backend [28].
7.2 User Interface and Security
As “Web of trust” depends on users’ decision, user in-
terface is also important factor on security. For example,
Whitten and Tygar [31] had ever pointed out some dan-
gerous errors occured with past PGP clients’ interface.
Users can connect to OpenPKSD with two kind of in-
terfaces, OpenPGP client or CGI on WWW. Providing
WWW interface, OpenPKSD must help users’ recogniza-
tion, judgement, and handling on OpenPGP public keys.
OpenPKSD displays only 64bit KeyID to identify
someone’s public keys. Though some other servers calcu-
late and display “fingerprint” of public keys before down-
load it, it does not help users arare of risk using keyserver.
As keyserver is just a pool and not CA, users should check
the public key with their own. Moreover, it is easy to
make some faked keyserver by Man-in-the-Middle At-
tack, TCP hijacking, etc. It means that the fingerprint
must be calculated under user’s (safe) machine and that is
the reason why OpenPKSD does not display fingerprint.
OpenPKSD WWW interface provides additional fea-
ture to visualize subpackets of PGP keys. As OpenPKSD
has an expandable format with subpackets, it is very hard
to understand the data structure inside this. Using pg-
pdump program, key packet visualizer that displays the
packet format of OpenPGP and PGP R© version 2.
Many PGP users are familiar with this verification on
added keys, as in 2000, PGP R© version 5.5.x to 6.5.3 had
a serious security hole that cannot detected with finger-
print verification. Then CERT/CC had alarted “Check
certificates for ADKs [Additional Decryption Keys] be-
fore adding them to a keyring.” [6] Pgpdump exactly visu-
alizes these additional keys. With pgpdump, OpenPKSD
helps users to recognize the information of public key and
any other added keys before downloading.
7.3 Performance and Future work
OpenPKSD is implemented with Ruby language and
PostgreSQL DBMS. Ruby is so-called “scripting lan-
guage” and seemed not suitable for a quick response
or large program development. However, OpenPKSD
succeeds not only the more compact code size but also
quick response compared with pksd, by loading bit cal-
culation modules such as CRC24 checksum written by
C language [29]. Table 1 shows the performance of
OpenPKSD version 0.2.8, non-cluster version, installed
on PC. OpenPKSD version 0.2.8 is also working well at
handling usual transaction between other PGP public key-
server described in section 6 since 2002.
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CPU: Intel Pentium4 1.6GHz
HDD: IDE ATA100 7200rpm 60GB
Memory: PC2100 768MB
One key query: 120ms average,
72ms best,
230ms worst.
Table 1: OpenPKSD Performance
Forthcoming developers’ version of OpenPKSD will
support some clustering based on the reserch on the per-
formance of cluster technology [30]. It will be published
in 2003 and support the experimental HKP(keyserver pro-
tocol over http) balancer, keyserver cluster, and clustered
database.
8 Summary
In this paper, we overlooked some PKI architectures. Us-
ing “Web of Trust,” OpenPGP PKI can help users to man-
age certification without CAs. However, there are the
problem on public key management, i.e., how to get the
receivers’ public key, or, how to tell everyone that the pub-
lic key is no longer valid. PGP keyserver is the solution
to the problem.
Though some PGP public keyservers have built a global
PKI, traditional PGP keservers have some limitations. We
introduced OpenPKSD, newly-designed and OpenPGP-
supported public keyserver project. OpenPKSD took its
first step, works well in practice, and examining the clus-
ter technology.
Availability
OpenPKSD source code and documents are avail-
able under GNU General Public License (GPL) at
http://www.openpksd.org/.
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X.509 CA Characteristics: Global Hierarchy. There are commercial X.509 CAs.
X.509 communities are built from the top-down.
Trust Model: Hierarchical Trust Model. Trust originates from a ‘trusted’
CA, over which the guardian may or may not have control.
A requestor provides a chain of authentication from the
‘trusted’ CA to the requestor’s key.
Signatures: Each certificate has one signature, belonging to the issuer
of the certificate.
Certificate Revocation: Uses CRL(Certificate Revocation List)s
Name Space: Global
Types of Certificates: Name Certificates
Name-to-Key binding: Single-valued function: each global name is bound to ex-
actly one key (assuming each user has a single public-
private key pair).
OpenPGP CA Characteristics: Egalitarian design. Each key can issue certificates.
PGP communities are built from the bottom-up in a
distributed manner.
Trust Model: Web of Trust, file-based PKI.
Signatures: Each certificate can have multiple signatures; the first
signature belongs to the issuer of the certificate.
Certificate Revocation: A ‘key revocation certificate,’ suicide note is posted on
PGP keyservers, and widely distributed to people who
have the compromised key on their public keyrings.
Name Space: Global
Types of Certificates: Name Certificates
Name-to-Key binding: Single-valued function: each global name is bound to ex-
actly one key (assuming each user has a single public-
private key pair).
SPKI/ SDSI CA Characteristics: Egalitarian design. The principals are the public keys.
Each key can issue certificates. SPKI/SDSI communities
are built from the bottom-up in a distributed manner.
Trust Model: Trust originates from the guardian. A requestor provides
a chain of authorization from the guardian to the
requestor’s key. The infrastructure has a clean, scalable
model for defining groups and delegating authority.
Signatures: Each certificate has one signature, belonging to the issuer
of the certificate.
Certificate Revocation: Advocates using short validity periods and Certificates of
Health.
Name Space: Local
Types of Certificates: Name Certificates, Authorization Certificates
Name-to-Key binding: Multi-valued function: each local name is bound to zero,
one or more keys (assuming each user has a single public
-private key pair).
Table 2: Comparison of X.509, OpenPGP, and SPKI/SDSI
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